

**Harvard University
Department of Government
Fall Semester 1998**

**Junior Seminar
Government (90 cv):
European Integration**

**Professor Andrew Moravcsik
Center for European Studies
Busch Hall**

moravcs@fas.harvard.edu

This seminar is designed to introduce the history, institutions and policies of the European Union, as well as some of the social scientific theories that best explain them. What social, political, and economic forces have propelled the process of European integration forward toward a single European market, currency, foreign policy, regulatory policy, and citizenship? What accounts for the successes and failures of integration in particular times and in particular matters? What is the future of this multinational experiment? What can it tell us about similar efforts elsewhere in the world?

Students in this course are expected to do all of the reading, to write a two-page response papers for three of the sessions, and to submit a research paper on an agreed research topic. This paper is to involve original empirical research or theoretical analysis on the subject of regional integration in Europe or elsewhere. The final two weeks of the semester will be devoted to collective presentation and critique of these papers.

The grade for the course will be calculated as follows: 25% on class participation and reading, 20% on written response papers, and 55% on the final research paper. The paper will be due the first day of exam period. No extensions will be granted unless agreed before the 6th week of the course or due to medical or similar excuse.

Copies of the following books are available for purchase from the Coop:

Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).

Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Andrew Moravcsik, ed., Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe faces the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).

Michael Newman, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

Michael O'Neill, ed., The Politics of European Integration: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1996).

Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Recommended readings have been included on the syllabus for students seeking a broader basis on which to write research papers or participate in discussion.

LIST OF TOPICS

1. The European Movement and the EC, 1945-1957: Federalists and Functionalists
2. Consolidating the Common Market, 1958-1970: Neo-Functionalism and its Critics
3. "Europe 1992" and "Behind-the-Border" Liberalization: Supranational or Intergovernmental?
4. Monetary Integration and a Single Currency: Towards the EMS and EMU
5. Internal and External Security Policy: Why Can't Europe Get Its Act Together?
6. Multi-Level Policy-Making in the EU: Agendas, Entrepreneurs, Interest Groups, and Governments
7. Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: Diplomacy through Drinks and Doctrine
8. Representation, Regulation and Citizenship: Is there a "Democratic Deficit" in Brussels?
9. The Future of European Integration: Centralization or Fragmentation?

10. Regionalism in Comparative Perspective: NAFTA, Asia, and the Rest of the World
11. Student Presentations

(1) TOWARDS THE EC, 1945-1958: FEDERALISTS AND FUNCTIONALISTS

What the motivations of governments that founded the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community, and sought to found the European Defense Community? Whence came their domestic political support? Who belonged to the postwar "European movement," what did they believe, and what influence did they have on national governments? How did they differ from interwar advocates of European unity? Why did integration start with a parliament, human rights, coal and steel? Why did governments construct quasi-constitutional institutions? Why did defense cooperation fail? What are the core differences between the federalist (ideological and geopolitical) and functionalist (economic) interpretations of this period and which is more persuasive? What is the difference between the economic interpretations of Jean Monnet, David Mitrany, and Alan Milward? How do the theories of integration proposed by Haas (neo-functionalism) and Moravcsik (the tripartite "liberal intergovernmentalist" model) differ from the federalist and functionalist approaches considered last week? How well do the four approaches do in explaining the course of events from 1955 to 1960? More specifically, did the motivations and process behind the founding of the EEC differ from those behind the EDC, the ECSC, and the Council of Europe? How does Jean Monnet's performance in 1957 compare to his brilliant success in 1950? What explains the choice of international institutions? Was there "neo-functionalism" feedback from the ECSC to the EEC?

Desmond Dinan, *An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 9-34.

Paul Rich, "Visionary Ideas of European Unity after World War I," in Philomena Murray and Paul Rich, eds., *Visions of European Unity* (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 21-34.

W. Lipgens, "Motives for European Unity," J. Monnet, "A Ferment of Change"; A. Spinelli, "The European Adventure"; M. Burgess, *The European Community's Federal Heritage*, D. Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration" and "A Working Peace System," Ernst Haas, "The Uniting of Europe," in Michael O'Neill, ed., *The Politics of European Integration: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 165-181, 191-200.

François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York: Norton, 1995), 182-215, 220-225, 235-257, 392-399.

Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London, 1984), 471-477, 491-502.

Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Introduction, Chapter 1 (pp. 1-10, 13-41, 49-77 ONLY), and Chapter Two.

Recommended:

Peter Stirk, "Introduction: Crisis and Continuity in Interwar Europe," in Stirk, ed., European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 1-23; F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 1-272; Thomas Risse, "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies 34:1 (1996), 53-80; Robert Marjolin, Europe in Search of its Identity (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1980), 11-35.

(2) CONSOLIDATING THE COMMON MARKET, 1958-1975: NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS

What explains the relative ease with which governments liberalized industrial trade in the 1960s and the extreme difficulty they encountered in liberalizing trade in agriculture? How is ultimate success in agriculture to be explained? What do different theoretical views of integration contribute to an explanation of this period? More specifically, which countries and societal groups within countries favored integration and why? How did governments bargain? Which aspects of policy were left in the hands of national governments and which were delegated to centralized rules and authorities—and why? What were the longer-term effects of prior commitments to the customs union and the CAP? What explains stronger and somewhat more successful efforts to reform European agriculture in the 1990s?

Dinan, Even Closer Union?, 39-64, 199-201, 206-227, 325-333.

Moravcsik, Choice for Europe, Chapter 3 (pp. 159-237)

L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, "Alternative Models of System Change," E. Haas, "Turbulent Fields," S. Hoffmann, "The European

Process at Atlantic Cross-Purposes," "Europe's Identity Crisis," "Obstinate or Obsolete," in O'Neill, ed., *Politics*, 201-205, 210-225.

Elmar Rieger, "The Common Agricultural Policy: Internal and External Dimensions," in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Union* 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 106-119 ONLY.

Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *International Regionalism: A Reader* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 149-166 ONLY. [Also can be found as Stephen R. Graubard, eds., *A New Europe?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 62-88 (read corresponding selections ONLY).]

Recommended:

Christopher Stevens, "EU Policy for the Banana Market: The External Impact of Internal Policies," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 325-351.

Rieger, "Common Agricultural Policy," 98-106.

François Duchêne, Edward Szczepanik, and Wilfrid Legg, *New Limits on European Agriculture: Politics and the Common Agricultural Policy* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

Michael Tracy, ed. *Farmers and Politics in France* (Enstone: Arkelton Trust, 1991).

Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe*, 273-365.

(3) "EUROPE 1992" AND BEHIND-THE-BORDER LIBERALIZATION: SUPRANATIONAL OR INTERGOVERNMENTAL BARGAINING?

How does trade liberalization through the harmonization and removal of "behind the border" regulations differ from tariff and quota removal? What implications does this have for the national interests of European governments? Why did such pressures rise in the early 1980s? Since almost any domestic regulation has implications for trade, how did European governments limit the impact of liberalization? Why and how did Commission officials and European Parliamentarians wield influence over the Single Act? How much influence did their leadership and entrepreneurship have on the final outcome? Why do authors disagree? What was the role of multinational business? How would we know? Is this confirmation, finally, of neo-functional predictions?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 69-70, 87-95, 110-125, 129-154, 335-361.

Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young, "The Single Market: A New Approach to Policy," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 125-155.

George Ross, Jacques Delors and *European Integration* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 26-39.

D. Muttimer, "1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neo-Functionalism Reconsidered," W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," A. Bressand, "Futures for Economic Integration," in O'Neill, ed., *Politics*, 283-287, 300-306, 311-314.

Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*, Chapter 5, pp. 314-378.

Recommended:

Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurship and International Cooperation," WCFIA Working Paper No. 98-10 (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998). [Available from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Publications Office and should be on Hollis Plus at CIAO.]

Dale Smith and Jürgen Wanke, "1992: Who Wins? Who Loses?" in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, eds., *The State of the European Community II: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 353-372.

David Allen, "Competition Policy: Policing the Single Market," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 157-183.

(4) MONETARY INTEGRATION AND A SINGLE CURRENCY: TOWARD EMS AND EMU

Why do governments seek to stabilize exchange rates? Why do they favor a single currency as a means of doing so? Under what conditions has it been possible? How can we explain the pattern over time of no convertibility until 1958, stable exchange rates under Bretton Woods until 1973, failed regional cooperation under the "Snake" until 1979, slowly strengthening cooperation until 1991, and a transition to monetary union (a single currency) thereafter? Which governments favor which kinds of exchange-rate stabilization? Does Do some governments wield more power than others? What explains the particular form of the single currency—

the autonomy of the ECB, the scope of its membership, and other rules of the regime? To what extent do these findings confirm the arguments of Tsoukalis, Cohen, Moravcsik, Krugman, Brittan, Ross, or Jones?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 70-87, 99-109, 417-435.

Loukas Tsoukalis, "Economic and Monetary Union," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 280-298.

Benjamin Cohen, "The Political Economy of Currency Regions," in Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 50-74.

Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*, Selections from Chapters 1, 6 (pp. 41-49, 379-447, 457-471).

Barry Eichengreen, "Should the Maastricht Treaty Be Saved?" (Princeton University: Princeton Studies in International Finance, 1992), 4-16 ONLY.

Paul Krugman, "European Money," in Krugman, *Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1994), 182-194.

Samuel Brittan, "Let Fools Contest the Forms," in O'Neill, *Politics*, 181-184.

Ross, Jacques Delors, 39-50.

Eric Jones, "Economic and Monetary Union: Playing with Money," in Andrew Moravcsik, ed., *Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe faces the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), 59-93.

Recommended:

Barry Eichengreen, "A More Perfect Union?" *European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice, Analysis* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 51-72, 247-270.

Kathleen McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13-42.

Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*, Chapter 4 (pp. 238-313).

Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," *International Organization* 47:1 (Winter 1993), 1-40.

(5) EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY:

WHY CAN'T EUROPE GET ITS ACT TOGETHER?

What exactly is at stake in European foreign policy, defense policy, and immigration/asylum/police cooperation? What are different national positions on these issues and how do we explain them? Why does Europe seem to have so much difficulty cooperating in these areas? Is it because so much is at stake substantively? Because of commitment to traditional symbols of sovereignty? What best explains the conditions under which and areas in which Europe has been able to cooperate? Was the EU's handling of the Bosnian crisis a failure for Europe? Would more intensive European cooperation have changed the outcome?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 465-497.

Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*, 447-457.

Phillip Gordon, "The Limits of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy," in Moravcsik, ed. *Centralization or Fragmentation?*, 159-185.

Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 27-33, 331-332.

Monica den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation without Integration," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 389-409.

Other Materials on the Bosnia Crisis.

Recommended:

Albrecht Funk, "Europeanization of National Immigration Policies in the EU?" (University of Pittsburgh: unpublished paper, 1997).

Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "Common Foreign and Security Policy: A New Policy or Just a New Name?" in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 411-435.

Juliet Lodge, "Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation," in Lodge, ed., *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (London: Pinter, 1993), 315-339.

(6) MULTI-LEVEL REGULATION: AGENDAS, ENTREPRENEURS, INTEREST GROUPS AND GOVERNMENTS

What are the various reasons why governments might delegate regulatory functions to supranational authorities? What are the

political implications of doing so? How do governments seek to maintain control? What determines how successful they can be at doing so? How does the resulting "multi-level" European policy process differ from those in its constituent nation-states? Does it differ across issues? What has been the outcome in environmental policy? In regional and structural policy—an area in which the system is designed specifically to empower subnational actors against national governments? Are outcomes of the European process suboptimal? What might improve the process?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 229-254, 363-380, 383-413.

Alberta Sbragia, "Environmental Policy: The 'Push-Pull' of Policy-Making," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 235-255.

Mark Pollack, "The Commission as an Agent," in Neill Nugent, ed. *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 109-128.

Giandomenico Majone, "The European Commission as a Regulator," "Policy Credibility, Relational Contracting, and the Delegation Problem," in Majone, ed., *Regulating Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 61-79.

F. Scharpf, "The Joint Decision Trap," in O'Neill, ed., *Politics*, 270-276.

Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Union: An Historical Institutional Account," *Comparative Political Studies* 29:2 (April 1996): 123-164.

Gary Marks, "Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC," in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, eds., *The State of the European Community II: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 391-410.

Mark Pollack, "Regional Actors in Intergovernmental Play: The Making and Implementation of EC Structural Policy," in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., *The State of the European Community III: Building a European Polity?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 361-390.

Recommended:

Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx, "Nationality and European Negotiations: The Working Groups of the Council of Ministers," *European Journal of International Relations* 3:4 (December 1997), 435-472.

David Allen, "Cohesion and Structural Adjustment," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 209-233.

Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, ed. *Lobbying in the European Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

(7) ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH DRINKS AND DOCTRINE?

How did Europe emerge as a "constitutional polity" in which European law is supreme to national law and the European Court of Justice is its definitive interpreter? What are the most important differences among interpretations of this process? Is such an arrangement in the interest of EU member states? What control do they retain over its future evolution? Is this sort of arrangement stable in the future? What might threaten it? Are there parallels with the experience of the US in the 19th and 20th centuries? If so, what do they suggest about the role of courts in a democratic, federal polity?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 295-306.

Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," *International Organization* 47:1 (Winter 1993): 41-76.

Geoffrey Garrett, "The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union," *International Organization* 49:1 (Winter 1995), 171-181.

Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett," *International Organization* 49:1 (Winter 1995), 183-190.

Karen Alter, "Who Are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice," *International Organization* 52:1 (Winter 1998), 121-148.

Recommended:

Eric Stein, "Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution," *American Journal of International Law* 75 (1981): 1-27.

Karen Alter, "The European Court's Political Power," *West European Politics* 19:3 (July 1996), 458-487.

Joseph H. H. Weiler and Joel Trachtman, "European Constitutionalism and its Discontents," *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business* 17:2-3 (Winter/Spring 1996/7), 354-397.

(8) REPRESENTATION, REGULATION, AND CITIZENSHIP: IS THERE A "DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT" IN EUROPE?

Why are EC institutions so non-participatory and non-majoritarian? Why do they grant such restrictive citizenship rights, compared to modern social European welfare states? How does this influence the outcomes of EC policy-making? Of national policy overall? Can such an arrangement be justified normatively in the democratic late 20th-century? On what basis should we evaluate EC institutions? What are the implications, advantages and disadvantages of different proposals to remedy it? How might answers to these questions apply to other countries (like the US) and other international organizations? Does this mark the demise of the European welfare state?

Dinan, *Ever Closer Union?*, 257-292.

Michael Newman, *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 77-107, 173-200.

Joseph Weiler with Ulrich Haltern and Franz Meyer, "European Democracy and its Critique," *West European Politics* 18:3 (July 1995): 4-39. [Or on the WWW from the HLS Jean Monnet Working Paper Series.]

Giandomenico Majone, "What Social Policy for Europe?" in Yves Mény, et al., *Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies* (London: Routledge, 1996), 123-136.

Wolfgang Streeck, "From Free Market to State Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy," in Paul Pierson and Stephan Leibfried, eds., *European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration* (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1995), 389-423 ONLY.

Recommended:

Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, "Social Policy," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 185-207.

Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: International Cooperation and Domestic Politics," *Center for European Studies Working Paper Series No. 52* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1994).

Paul Pierson, "Social Policy and European Integration," in Moravcsik, *Centralization or Fragmentation?*, 124-158.

George Tsebelis, "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 128-142.

Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, "Organized Interests and the Europe of 1992?" in Norman Ornstein and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., *Political Power and Social Change* (Washington: AEI Press, 1991), 46-47.

(9) THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION?

On what reliable social scientific basis can we make reliable predictions about the future of European integration? What challenges does European integration face today and in the future? Has the EU reached the end of the possibilities of the technocratic, undemocratic style of integration with which integration began? Is there any justification for further centralization of authority? Are deepening and widening compatible or contradictory? What does the disappointing outcome of the recent IGC tell us?

Timothy Garten Ash, "Europe's Endangered Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1998), 51-65. [Available on HOLLIS PLUS at PRO-Quest.]

Stanley Hoffmann, "Back to Europessimism? A Jeremiad Too Fond of Gloom and Doom," *Foreign Affairs* 76:1 (January/February 1997), 139-145.

Alberta Sbragia, "Thinking about the European Future: The Use of Comparison," in Sbragia, ed., *Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 257-291.

Philippe Schmitter, "Some Alternative Futures for the European Polity and their Implications for European Public Policy," in Mény, et al., *Adjusting to Europe*, 25-37.

Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, "Policy Framing: Interest Groups and the Lead-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference," *West European Politics* 20.3 (July 1997), 111-133.

Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "The Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence,

Institutions," *Journal of Common Market Studies* (forthcoming) [Manuscript to be distributed.]

Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, "Policies toward Central and Eastern Europe," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 353-385.

A. Smith, "National Identities and the Idea of European Unity," in O'Niell, *Politics*, 314-319.

Recommended:

Andrew Moravcsik, "The Prospects for European Integration: Managing Deepening, Diversity and Democratization," in Moravcsik, ed., *Centralization or Fragmentation?, Democracy*, 00-00.

Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "Federalist Vision and Constitutional Reality in the Treaty of Rome," *Journal of Common Market Studies – Annual Survey 1998* (Oxford: Blackwill, 1998).

William Wallace, "Government without Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 439-460.

(10) REGIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: NAFTA, ASIA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

How are other attempts at regional integration similar to and different from the European case? How is such variation to be explained? Are the same theories and methods applicable? What do they predict? What other factors need to be considered? More broadly, is regionalism the wave of the future or the residue of the past? Are the US and European Community going to get along in the future?

Marc Busch and Helen Milner, "The Future of the International Trading System: International Firms, Regionalism, and Domestic Politics," in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, eds., *Political Economy and the Changing World Order* (London: Macmillan, 1994).

Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe*, 494-501.

Joseph Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas," in Mansfield and Milner, *Political Economy*, 164-187.

"Clinton in Europe," *Inside Europe* 5:6 (June 1997), 1-2.

Stephen Woolcock and Michael Hodges, "EU Policy in the Uruguay Round," in Wallace and Wallace, eds., *Policy-Making*, 301-324.

Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas," in Mansfield and Milner, *Political Economy*, 20-49.

Recommended:

Andrew Moravcsik, "The Prospects for European Integration: Managing Deepening, Diversity and Democratization," in Moravcsik, ed., *Centralization or Fragmentation?*, 1-58.

Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut, "The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of Economic Integration" in C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland eds., *Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 183-224.

Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, "Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area," *Review of International Political Economy* 3:2 (Summer 1996), 319-348.